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I. INTRODUCTION 
Access to knowledge is fundamental for thriving in a digital 
economy and digital society.1 We live in an era of unprecedented 
access to online materials and can instantly access movies on Netflix, 
browse books on Google Books, and listen to numerous music clips 
on YouTube. However, access to knowledge remains a major 
challenge. Despite the fact that everything seems available online, it 
is not “free” in a way that can ensure freedom. In fact, over the past 
two decades, users’ freedom to access, experience, transform and 
share creative materials has constantly declined. 
Much of the content available online is locked behind paywalls.2 
You cannot read the content without paying a fee or purchasing a 
subscription.3 Full-time academic scholars, researchers and students 
may not even notice these barriers. They rely on their institutional 
subscriptions, which make most books and academic journals 
available on their systems. But some research institutions, especially 
outside the US and Europe, cannot afford the high subscription fees. 
They may also be too expensive for many small universities or 
NGOs.4 The same is true for individuals unaffiliated with universities 
and businesses. What if, for instance, you or your relatives suffer 
from a medical condition and you wish to learn more about it? You 
will need to purchase several articles. A single copy of an article can 
cost as much as $40. If you are a journalist, a freelance writer or an 
independent blogger, you will most likely be denied access. 
Businesses may purchase access to content, but if they expect to 
 
 1.  See generally Amy Kapczynski, Access to Knowledge: A Conceptual 
Genealogy, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
17, 20-21 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (arguing that 
knowledge has become central to the global economy, and essential for economic 
growth, human health and political activism).  
 2.  See Manon A. Ress, Open Access to Publishing: From Principles to 
Practice, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 475, 
475-478 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (identifying the 
increasing prices of serial-subscription costs accompanied with the decreasing 
research-library budgets as one of the causes in the decline of access to 
knowledge). 
 3.  See id. at 477.  
 4.  See John Bohannon, Who’s Downloading Pirated Papers? Everyone, 
Science (Apr. 28, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/ 
04/whos-downloading-pirated-papers-everyone.  
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generate some income, from making that content available to others, 
then they will also have to charge a fee to recover their investment. 
This places further barriers on generating open content that is freely 
available, and subsequently marginalizes the creation of non-
commercial content by non-profit entities. 
Yet, cost is not the only reason for the lack of freedom in access to 
knowledge. Major developments in design are affecting access to 
knowledge, including the transition to cloud computing and mobile 
internet, the shift from copies to streaming, and facilitation by online 
intermediaries.5 Consequently, much of the access to content that is 
made available online, is shaped by the design, business models, and 
technological measures exercised by online intermediaries. We are 
often offered “free content” by online intermediaries, but “pay” with 
our personal data. Users should be free to explore any cultural, 
religious, professional, or political content without the monitoring by 
third parties. Yet today, access to content posted online is often 
subject to surveillance. 
Overall, many of the threats facing access to knowledge lie 
beyond copyright. This new phase in managing access to creative 
content forces copyright to take the back seat, making room for more 
powerful mechanisms that govern access to cultural works: the 
design of online facilitating systems and contractual obligations. 
These new challenges require a new thinking with respect to fair 
use. Fair use is often considered essential for securing access to 
knowledge.6 Fair use was enacted as a statutory standard in section 
107 of the 1976 Copyright Act,7 authorizing the courts to consider 
and weigh four factors when determining whether certain use of a 
 
 5.  See Susan K. Sell, A Comparison of A2K Movements: From Medicines to 
Farmers, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
391, 399-400 (Gaelle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010) (detailing 
“preemptive measures” that make it illegal to perform acts associated with the 
circumvention of technology that is designed to limit access to materials). 
 6.  See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th 
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fair use right was codified to maintain the constitutionally 
mandated balance to ensure that the public has access to knowledge.”) See also 
Michael I. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law 12 VAND. J. 
ENT. & TECH. L. 817 (2010); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer 
Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of 
Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49 (1993).  
 7. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). 
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copyrighted work is permissible without a license. This open-ended 
nature of fair use gives courts discretion to evolve the law. The 
flexibility rendered by this standard has certainly enabled U.S courts 
to adjust exceptions and limitations to copyright in a rapidly 
changing world.8 Many countries worldwide are seriously 
contemplating adapting more flexible norms in order to address these 
challenges.9 However, fair use alone might not suffice to 
counterbalance the emerging challenges to access to knowledge. 
An extensive study of enforcement practices pertaining to online 
copyright infringements in Israel offers empirical evidence of the 
impact of fair use in the digital era. Israel introduced fair use about a 
decade ago in the 2007 Copyright Act.10 The study compared two 
major enforcement strategies following the enactment of the law: 
traditional court proceedings and Notice and Takedown procedures 
implemented by online intermediaries. The findings suggest that 
introducing a fair use provision in the statute might be an important 
step, yet, this alone cannot safeguard access to knowledge. 11 
Based on these findings, this Article argues that in order to secure 
a sufficient level of free and unlicensed access to knowledge, it is 
necessary to develop a more comprehensive approach to permissible 
uses that would incorporate fair use in new and innovative ways. The 
approach proposed in this Article is twofold: First, at the conceptual 
level, fair use should be interpreted as a user’s right and not merely 
an affirmative defense. Second, fair use should be incorporated into 
online enforcement systems, by embedding fair use considerations in 
the design. 
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II of this Article discusses 
access to knowledge and analyzes emerging challenges in the online 
setting. Part III presents empirical evidence of the impact of fair use 
in two enforcement contexts - court proceedings and online 
intermediaries. Part IV discusses the new frontiers of fair use. It 
 
 8. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d 202, 202 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 9. See, e.g., AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 122, COPYRIGHT 
AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, (2014) (recommending that Australia would adopt a 
flexible fair use copyright exception modeled after the United States statutory 
provision on fair use). 
 10.  Copyright Law, 5768–2007, SH No. 2199, 34, §19 (2007) (Isr.). 
 11.  See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrates how an approach to fair use that focuses on user rights 
could enhance fair use and secure access to knowledge. 
II. FAIR USE AND NEW CHALLENGES TO ACCESS 
TO KNOWLEDGE 
A. ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
Knowledge is undoubtedly a key for participating in the 
information society. Access to knowledge is necessary for working 
and competing in the information economy, for participation in civil 
society, and for developing and enjoying culture.12 In addition, it is 
no less important for active citizenship, making informed choices, 
and taking part in the democratic political process.13 
Access to knowledge involves freedom to access materials and to 
read and learn from existing knowledge, as well as the freedom to 
make use of content, rearrange it, change it, or invoke new meanings. 
It also includes the freedom to engage in knowledge and to share 
information with others in the course of conversations and 
exchanges.14 Access to knowledge is clearly a necessary pre-
condition to freedom. That is not simply because it is necessary for 
self-expression, but because it is essential for a society that seeks to 
diversify the sources of knowledge available to the public.15 When all 
individuals can potentially speak out and be heard, thoughts and 
views are less likely to be shaped by the governing “party line” or by 
corporate speech. 
Much of our thinking about access to knowledge in the digital era 
assumes an environment of total availability, where users were 
directly connected and could freely share content of their choosing 
without any interference.16 The Access to Knowledge framework has 
 
 12.  See William W. Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1661, 1694-95 (1998). 
 13.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, Cyberlaw and Social Change: A Democratic 
Approach to Copyright Law in Cyberspace, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 
216-17 (1996); see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288 (1996). 
 14.  NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 63 (2008). 
 15.  Rebecca Tushnet, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free 
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 565-66 (2004). 
 16.  See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 26 COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 
(2004).  
ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/16  3:45 PM 
6 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:1 
therefore focused primarily on free access to content and on the legal 
barriers placed by copyright law on free access.17 Thus, “free access” 
was essentially conceived as freedom to copy and download without 
charge, but also as freedom to upload and share, and the freedom to 
change and adapt.18 The steady expansion of copyright over the past 
two decades has threatened to limit the freedom available to users.19 
Consequently, efforts to secure access to knowledge have focused on 
copyright barriers, seeking to expand Limitation and Exceptions 
(L&E) to copyright, and advocating the introduction of new L&E or 
more flexible norms that could mitigate the extensive scope of 
copyright.20 
Copyright law still plays a central role in shaping access to 
knowledge affecting users’ ability to read, view or listen to materials, 
to use and reuse original works, and to share them with others.21 One 
example is the use of copyrighted materials for educational and 
research purposes. Teaching often involves the use of copyrighted 
materials. The unlicensed copying of works to make them available 
to students in the course of teaching may constitute a copyright 
infringement unless exempted under fair use.22 In recent years, the 
scope of legitimate use of content for research and educational 
purposes has become contentious.23 Many publishers of books, 
 
 17.  See JEREMY MALCOLM, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE FOR CONSUMERS: 
REPORTS OF CAMPAIGNS AND RESEARCH 2 (Jeremy Malcolm ed. 2010). 
 18.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART & COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE 
HYBRID ECONOMY 192, 249 (2008). 
 19.  See generally JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE 
COMMONS OF THE MIND 116-17 (2008). 
 20.  See Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project: Directions for 
Reform, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1175, 1228 (2010); see, e.g., BERNT 
HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN R.F. SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE - IN SEARCH OF 
FLEXIBILITIES 10, 21 (2011). 
 21.  See Tina Amirtha, The Open Publishing Revolution, Now Behind a Billion-
Dollar Paywall, FAST COMPANY (Apr. 17, 2015, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3042443/mendeley-elsevier-and-the-future-of-
scholarly-publishing. 
 22.  See, e.g., William W. Fisher & William McGeveran, The Digital Learning 
Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital 
Age, 20-21 (Berkman Ctr. For Internet & Soc’y, Research Pub. No. 2006-09, 2006) 
[hereinafter The Digital Learning Challenge].  
 23.  The scope of fair use for educational purpose was also a matter of 
controversy prior to the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. See WILLIAM F. 
PARTY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW (1985) (discussing the 
debate over educational use).  
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academic journals, and newspapers have adjusted their business 
models to facilitate online delivery.24 Academic publishers are 
introducing “paywalls,” that range from strict, where every access to 
content is subject to payment, to more flexible options, where some 
content is freely available (“soft,” “leaky,” or “freemium”).25 
Publishers have also exercised copyright to combat online sharing of 
scientific articles and the making available of excerpts for 
educational purposes.26 For instance, in a recent lawsuit filed by 
major academic publishers against Georgia State University (GSU), 
the publishers claimed that copies stored in the university’s 
electronic course reserve system, which offered web access to 
excerpts from books and journals to the students enrolled in the 
course, violated their copyright.27 GSU asserted that making these 
copies was within the boundaries of fair use.28 The Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit held that GSU might be liable for uploading 
excerpts of copyrighted books to its electronic course reserve system, 
as fair use analysis should always be performed on a work-by-work 
basis, “taking into account whether the amount taken—qualitatively 
and quantitatively—was reasonable in light of the pedagogical 
purpose of the use and the threat of market substitution.”29 
At the same time, however, some courts offered a fairly broad 
 
 24.  See Amirtha, supra note 21 (emphasizing that digital sales have become a 
major source of revenue for the publishing industry. For instance, in 2014, 
Elsevier, one of the big four academic publishers, representing over 3000 academic 
journals, listed a profit of $1.1 billion on revenues of 3.1 billion, largely by selling 
individual research papers and journal subscriptions).  
 25.  Id. (explaining that some free content is funded by advertising, or becomes 
available following an embargo period, and that publishers have engaged in data 
collection, seeking to leverage their exclusive control of content).  
 26.  See Elsevier v. Sci-Hub, No. 1:15-CV-04282, Compl. ¶ 1, 5, 6 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015) (detailing Elsevier’s recently filed complaint against the Library Genesis 
project and Sci-Hub.org search engine); see also Amirtha, supra note 21 
(discussing Elsevier also exercising its copyright in 2013 in order to put pressure 
on the open science social network, Mendeley, to remove access to any scientific 
articles published in one of its many academic journals. This pressure eventually 
led to the acquisition of the startup company. Elsevier demanded that abstracts 
from the API, and PDF previews be removed, claiming copyright infringement. 
After the acquisition, Elsevier’s materials are now fully available on the system). 
 27.  See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 
2014). 
 28.  Id. at 1242. 
 29.  Id. at 1283. 
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interpretation of fair use, which permits important educational and 
scientific uses. In the case of Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, for 
example, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on a 
digital library containing digitized versions of the library collections 
of partnering universities, holding that systematic digitization of 
copyrighted books by universities for the purpose of search was fair 
use.30 The court found that full-text searchable database, which 
returns the book name and page number for matching search results, 
was transformative, since the copies served a different purpose than 
the original works.31 These recent rulings demonstrate the advantage 
of fair use in allowing the court to enable new, innovative uses of 
copyrighted works, thus advancing the goals of copyright. 
Similarly, in Canada, which follows the more rigid legal standard 
of fair dealing, the Supreme Court recently expanded the breadth of 
education-related purposes that qualify as fair dealing.32 The court 
formulated a broad definition of private study that includes copies 
made by teachers for students’ use.33 In another decision, the 
Canadian Supreme Court broadly interpreted research to include 
sampling during consumer research for online purchase of music.34 
But challenges to access to knowledge are no longer limited to 
copyright alone. Copyright law, which has been at the forefront of 
the access to knowledge campaign over the past two decades, now 
seems to be taking a back seat as emerging forces that limit free 
access come into play. These arising challenges are further discussed 
in the next section. 
B. NEW FRONTIERS IN ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
Copyright is no longer the sole form of constraint on access to 
knowledge. Limitations on access to digital materials are linked to 
 
 30.  See Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, supra note 8.  
 31.  Id.  
 32.  See Alberta (Educ.) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access 
Copyright), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345, 362 (explaining that “the word ‘private’ in 
‘private study’ should not be understood as requiring users to view copyrighted 
works in splendid isolation. Studying and learning are essentially personal 
endeavors, whether they are engaged in with others or in solitude”).  
 33.  See id., at 362. 
 34.  See generally Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can., 
[2004] 2 S.C.R. 427 (Can.).  
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major shifts in design, emerging business models, and changes in 
alliances and interests as a result. 
The rise of cloud computing and mobile internet has facilitated a 
fundamental shift in content delivery, as the distribution of copies is 
replaced with streaming and access services. The distributed network 
architecture of open access and total availability of content, which 
has characterized the evolution of the internet since the early 1990s, 
enabled every user connected to network to store, upload, and 
directly share content with other users of the network. This 
distributed design, is now being sidelined by a more centralized and 
closely-monitored environment in which use is no longer anonymous 
(e.g., mobile internet, social media) and content delivery is stored on 
the cloud rather than in end nodes. Consequently, management and 
control over the storage and delivery of content in this environment 
is centralized.35 
A second technological shift that affects access to knowledge is 
the method of delivering content. Instead of delivering copies of 
content, cloud computing and mobile internet make it possible to 
offer content as services. Rather than buying printed books, records, 
CDs, or DVDs, users can purchase all-you-can-eat access 
subscriptions to music, books and movies, which are made available 
online through streaming technology. Netflix, Spotify, and Google 
Books are just a few examples. This shift facilitates ongoing 
technical control over the use and distribution of copyrighted 
materials. Users no longer control a physical copy of the material and 
their access to the content may expire at any time. This weakens 
users and limits their ability to choose how to use content and 
whether to share it.36 
The result is a more centralized infrastructure, which enables 
control over data, content, applications and users. It shifts power 
from the end nodes to central operators. The shift to cloud computing 
has placed knowledge and cultural products (software, books, 
 
 35.  Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 
DÆDALUS, 18 (2016).  
 36.  A striking example of the lack of user control, in the shift to streaming, is 
the case of Amazon; Amazon.com apologized and settled a class action suit for 
violating its terms of service by remotely removing purchased copies of George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) from Kindles. See Brad Stone, Amazon 
Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, N.Y. Times, July 18, 2009, at B1. 
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academic articles, music and videos) beyond the physical control of 
the end-user. The availability of content in online platforms such as 
Facebook or YouTube is governed by the platform, which shapes 
what becomes available, and which content will be removed.37 
Decisions on what to upload and download, what to watch, and what 
could be shared and how – are increasingly governed by publishers 
and online intermediaries. 
The use of content and the terms of accessing the content will 
often be defined by a license or contractual provisions of the 
facilitating platform’s Terms of Use.38 Much of the content 
distributed online is subject to licenses, and many restrictions on 
users’ freedom to access and use copyrighted materials are 
contractual. 39 Under licenses, users are often defined as non-owners 
of a copy of the work - as “licensees” - and the license often sets 
limits on the right to resell the accessed copy.40 Some EULAs restrict 
permissible use to designated reading devices (e.g., iBooks for iPad), 
or permit the making of only a limited number of backup copies.41 
Another dimension affecting the availability of free access is 
market structure. Access to knowledge is facilitated by a handful of 
online intermediaries (mega-platforms) with significant market 
power in a market with strong economies of scale.42Online 
intermediaries such YouTube, Facebook, and Google often converge 
control over content, access, and distribution channels and control of 
end users’ personal data.43 This may inhibit consumers’ choices and 
 
 37.  Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone 
Ever Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 2, 2014), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/117878. 
 38.  See B.J. Ard, Notice and Remedies in Copyright Licensing, 80 MO. L. REV. 
313, 322 (2015).  
 39.  See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, 
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 10-12 (2011) (discussing problems 
associated with pervasive boilerplate agreements in modern society). 
 40.  See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 
2010). 
 41.  See David R. Hansen, A State Law Approach to Preserving Fair Use in 
Academic Libraries, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 32-33 
(2011). 
 42.  Nicolai Van Gorp & Olga Batura, Challenges for Competition Policy in a 
Digitalised Economy, EU Doc. No. IP/A/ECON/2014-12 (2015).  
 43.  See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), THE ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL ROLE OF INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 9 (2010), 
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weaken competitive pressure. 
Access facilitated by intermediaries is shaped by their business 
models. First, online intermediaries increasingly profit from selling 
content.44 Emerging business models also generate revenues from 
content through alliances with right-holders. Aside from facilitating 
communication among end-users or offering new distribution 
channels to publishers, online intermediaries have also become 
publishers, producers, distributors, and marketers of music, movies, 
eBooks, and apps.45 
Second, access to knowledge that mediated by online 
intermediaries is often offered as a service, and is tied to an ongoing 
contact of intermediaries with each user through a variety of content 
services (e.g., search, display, internet access, content access). 
Online intermediaries profit from data extracted from users who 
access content services.46 Data collection on users’ interests and 
online behavior creates a stream of revenue from targeted 
advertising.47 Data and data-related services have become an 
 
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf [hereinafter OECD]. See 
Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of Online 
Intermediaries, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM IN OF COPYRIGHT IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE (Susy Frankel & Daniel J Gervais eds., 2014). 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  See Greg Bensinger, Amazon to Begin Producing, Acquiring Original 
Movies, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 19, 2015 3:20 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-to-begin-producing-acquiring-original-
movies-1421687531 (revealing that YouTube and Amazon are investing in the 
production of original movies); see also Pricing Page for Amazon Kindle Direct 
Publishing, AMAZON, https://kdp.amazon.com/help?topicId=A29FL26OKE7R7B 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (offering another example in Amazon’s Kindle Direct 
Publishing (KDP) that offers authors a whole range of self-publishing options 
through the Amazon Kindle Store); Authors & Book Publishers: Frequently Asked 
Questions, ITUNES, http://www.apple.com/itunes/working-itunes/sell-content/ 
books/book-faq.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (showing that authors can earn 
seventy percent of the royalties from the sale of such books). 
 46.  What Type of Content Can I Monetize, YOUTUBE, https://support.google. 
com/youtube/answer/2490020?hl=en (last visited Aug. 13, 2016) (stating that 
online intermediaries, such as YouTube, offer free content in exchange for 
personal data). 
 47.  Study Finds Behaviorally-Targeted Ads More Than Twice as Valuable, 
Twice as Effective As Non-Targeted Online Ads, NETWORK ADVERTISING 
INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.networkadvertising.org/pdfs/NAI_ 
Beales_Release.pdf. 
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independent source of revenues.48 Data may also be collected 
through playing devices (e.g., iPhone and Kindle).49 Widespread 
monitoring and automated filtering by online platforms (e.g., 
YouTube Content ID) create further layers of protection that may 
threaten users’ rights to privacy and freedom of expression.50 
Access to Knowledge requires certain assurances of intellectual 
privacy.51 Freedom from ongoing monitoring is necessary to protect 
the intimate and private nature of the educational experience that is 
essential for meaningful learning. Intellectual privacy is also 
important for maintaining academic freedom52 and the freedom for 
users to be actively involved in creating culture.53 Surveillance-free 
access is not simply a matter of privacy but can also affect the ability 
of user-authors to participate actively in the creative process by 
generating and disseminating cultural works. Fear of monitoring may 
 
 48.  Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of 
an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015).  
 49.  See Corynne McSherry, Adobe Spyware Reveals (Again) the Price of 
DRM: Your Privacy and Security, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/adobe-spyware-reveals-again-price-drm-
your-privacy-and-security (providing examples in which digital distribution 
involves built-in surveillance, such as the collection and storage of reading habits 
and intellectual preferences when users download music, apps, and eBooks to 
Smartphones and e-Readers, which turns formerly intimate and private experiences 
into public knowledge. The author also asserts that built-in surveillance 
exemplifies information collection methods, such as Adobe Spyware’s tracking 
and reporting of Digital Editions reader habits, which illustrates the growing 
concerns for reader privacy and security). 
 50.  See Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback: User-Generated 
Content Principles and the DMCA, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 363, 388-90 (2009); 
see also Ira S. Nathenson, Civil Procedures for a World of Shared and User-
Generated Content, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 911, 938 (2010).  
 51.  See generally Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 
(2008) (analyzing intellectual property with regard to the First Amendment and 
concepts of privacy). 
 52.  Monitoring the use of copyrighted materials for collecting royalties may 
create a chilling effect on students and researchers who seek to explore different 
types of content in private. Copyright could facilitate access to such data. For 
instance, the plaintiff in the Georgia State University case the plaintiff sought 
access to the e-Reserve system and the original records for the three year period at 
issue in order to calculate royalties owed royalties. See Patton, supra note 27, at 
1237.  
 53.  See Richards, supra note 51, at 387 (arguing that a robust creative culture 
requires intellectual privacy in which creators can develop ideas free from the 
threat of their electronic distribution before showcasing them to the public). 
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create a chilling effect, causing users to refrain from seeking specific 
knowledge resources or reading particular materials for fear of their 
interests being monitored and recorded.54 To promote creativity, 
copyright law should encourage freedom to explore any cultural, 
religious, professional, political, or other type of resource, without 
the surveillance of third parties.55 
C. BARRIERS TO ACCESS AND COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT BY 
ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES 
As data consumption shifts from copies to streaming, users lose 
control over their data and applications as they are all stored on 
remote facilities and are subject to the terms and conditions dictated 
by an online provider. Indeed, Technological Protection Measures 
(TPMs) and Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, which 
were perceived as the greatest threat to access to knowledge at the 
end of the 90’s, did not prove useful for protecting copies of music 
and software.56 Yet, online streaming, cloud computing, and mobile 
internet strengthen the effectiveness of technological measures and 
make algorithmic management of access much more robust. The 
shift to cloud computing and streaming services put users at a 
disadvantage. Users have become completely dependent on access 
providers, who can terminate access to any material at any time. 
Cloud computing and streaming services effectively dominate 
mass distribution of content. Particularly, online intermediaries filter, 
block, and disable access to copyrighted materials to minimize their 
exposure to copyright liability.57 The Digital Millennium Copyright 
 
 54.  Ernie Smith, Writers Group: Surveillance Having a Chilling Effect, ASS’N 
NOW (Jan. 6, 2015), http://associationsnow.com/2015/01/writers-group-
surveillance-chilling-effect/ (revealing that fiction and nonfiction writers in fifty 
countries expressed deep concern with surveillance and self-censored by avoiding 
controversial topics in work or personal communications, which threatens 
independent thinking by penetrating the intimacy of reading). 
 55.  See Global Chilling: The Impact of Mass Surveillance on International 
Writers, PEN AM. (Jan. 5, 2015), https://pen.org/global-chill. 
 56.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Pros and Cons of Strengthening Intellectual 
Property Protection: Technological Protection Measures and Section 1201 of the 
United States Copyright Act, 16 INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. L. 191, 197 (2007) 
(giving the example of RealNetworks in which its Player did not allow user 
copying of music but its Server allowed ‘copy switching’ which enabled 
unauthorized copying of music).  
 57.  See Niva Elkin-Koren, Fair Use: Rights Matter, COPYRIGHT AT HARVARD 
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Act58 (DMCA) conferred safe harbor protection for online 
intermediaries that remove allegedly infringing content upon 
receiving notice according to the Notice and Takedown (N&TD) 
procedure defined by the law.59 While some online intermediaries 
simply implement the DMCA safe harbor provisions, others go 
beyond the statutory requirements and apply voluntary measures to 
filter, block or remove certain content for various business purposes 
(“DMCA-Plus”).60 YouTube’s Content ID is a classic example. The 
YouTube Content ID system has turned the algorithmic 
implementation of N&TD into a business opportunity by offering a 
platform that generates profit from DMCA-Plus services for 
YouTube and its business partners.61 Content ID allows copyright 
owners to identify their works using a digital identifying code.62 The 
system then notifies subscribed copyright holders whenever a video 
that matches content that they own is uploaded to YouTube.63 System 
subscribers are then given four options: (1) mute audio that matches 
their music; (2) block a whole video from being viewed; (3) 
monetize the video by running ads against it; or (4) track the video’s 
 
LIBRARY (Feb. 26, 2016), https://blogs.harvard.edu/copyrightosc (arguing that 
false-positive removals of non-infringing materials threaten access to knowledge). 
 58.  17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). 
 59.  See infra note 129. 
 60.  Annemarie Bridy, Comment, Copyright’s Digital Deputies: DMCA-Plus 
Enforcement by Internet Intermediaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC 
COMMERCE LAW (forthcoming 2016).  
 61.  See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Black Box Tinkering: Beyond 
Transparency in Algorithmic Enforcement (July 26, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741513 (arguing for more accountability in 
algorithmic systems of online enforcement; see also Statistics, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2016) 
(demonstrating that content ID currently scans over 400 years-worth of video and 
utilizes more than 25 million reference files of more than 5,000 partners, including 
US network broadcasters, record labels, and movie studios). 
 62.  Content ID employs digital fingerprinting to sample an uploaded file and 
compare it against a database of reference files provided by participating copyright 
owners. See Brad Stone & Miguel Helft, New Weapon in Web War over Piracy, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2007, at C1 (discussing fingerprinting technologies for 
identifying audio and video); see also Craig Seidel, Content Fingerprinting from 
an Industry Perspective, in 2009 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
MULTIMEDIA AND EXPO 1524, 1525 (2009) (discussing the technicalities of how 
fingerprinting is used to identify copyrighted content). 
 63.  How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/ 
answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Aug. 11, 2016).  
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viewership statistics.64 
The choices made by the online intermediaries on how online 
content is filtered, removed, disabled, or blocked, lack any 
transparency and legal oversight.65 There are numerous anecdotal 
examples of erroneous removals and blocked access to non-
infringing materials (false positive), but its overall scope remains 
unknown.66 Access might be blocked based on copyright allegations 
but also for reasons other than copyright enforcement, thus basically 
performing robust censorship. For instance, a short clip from the 
highly controversial movie, The Innocence of Muslims, which 
sparked violent outbreaks across the Middle East, was blocked by 
Google in several regions following informal requests made by 
governments, and without any court order.67 In another example, 
YouTube removed videos of India’s Daughter, a documentary film 
based on the gang rape of a 23-year-old student.68 This film was 
banned in India, presumably due to copyright infringement 
allegations.69 YouTube also removed a series of important health-
related videos that were created to debunk claims made in the movie 
House of Numbers against current treatments for HIV/AIDS and its 
argument that HIV positive people should stop taking life-saving 
medications.70 Additionally, Fitnah, a satirical show on YouTube, 
 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic 
Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).  
 66.  See, e.g., David Zielenzinger, Google Blocking Access to ‘Innocence of 
Muslims’ In Middle East, India, INT’L. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2012, 11:23 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/google-blocking-access-%E2%80%98innocence-
muslims%E2%80%99-middle-east-india-789258.  
 67.  See id.  
 68.  Unfortunately, however, YouTube removed most copies of the film soon 
after they became available due to copyright infringement allegations made by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), who allegedly made the original 
broadcast from which the uploaded copies were taped. See YouTube Removes 
India’s Daughter Videos after BBC Copyright Request, Trademarks & Brands 
Online, TRADEMARKS & BRANDS ONLINE (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www. 
trademarksandbrandsonline.com/news/youtube-removes-india-s-daughter-videos-
after-bbc-copyright-request-4289.  
 69.  See id.  
 70.  See Timothy Geigner, AIDS Denial Crazies Go All DMCA on Videos 
Educating People of their Craziness, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2014, 1: 44 PM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140210/05172926163/aids-denial-crazies-go-
all-dmca-videos-educating-people-their-craziness.shtml. 
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was censored when Rotana, the primary, state-funded Saudi TV 
channel, requested that DMCA remove several of their videos.71 
These examples show that removal of non-infringing materials that 
might be legitimately used without requiring a license, clearly 
threatens access to knowledge. 
Overall, access to content provided by online intermediaries and 
the prevalence of algorithmic filtering, removal and blocking, is 
effectively changing the copyright default. If copyrighted materials 
were once available unless proven to be infringing, any materials 
detected by the algorithm are now unavailable unless explicitly 
authorized by the copyright owner. 
III. FAIR USE ON THE GROUND: THE ISRAELI 
CASE STUDY 
Copyright law seeks to promote creation of new works for the 
benefit of the public.72 Consequently, the law not only offers 
incentives to authors but also seeks to foster access to creative works 
for the purpose of further creation, learning, intellectual enrichment 
and progress.73 Fair use is commonly viewed as facilitating a balance 
within copyright law to serve this purpose.74 
Can fair use effectively secure access to knowledge in our era? 
 
 71.  Copyright Law as a Tool for State Censorship of the Internet, BEFORE IT’S 
NEWS (Dec. 3, 2014, 11:22 AM), http://beforeitsnews.com/libertarian/2014/12/ 
copyright-law-as-a-tool-for-state-censorship-of-the-internet-2589350.html.  
 72.  This is grounded in the constitutional purpose of copyright law, that is 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 
8. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“[T]he economic philosophy 
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant copyrights is the conviction that 
encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance 
public welfare [by promoting the creation and dissemination of ideas] through the 
talents of authors.”).  
 73.  HathiTrust, supra note 8, at 94-95 (quoting Leval to highlight that 
copyright law is acknowledged as “not an inevitable, divine, or natural right that 
confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to 
stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the 
public”); accord Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1107 (1990).  
 74.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (“From the 
infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted 
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”) 
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Fair use advocates believe that it can.75 They argue that the open-
ended nature of fair use, offers flexibility that is particularly 
important for adjusting copyright limitations and exceptions to the 
dynamic requirements of rapidly developing technology.76 The ruling 
in Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, for example, demonstrates that 
authorizing the court to adjust limitations on copyright to dynamic 
technological and economic circumstances, could facilitate new, 
innovative uses of copyrighted works.77 Here the court held that 
creating a new full-text searchable database of the books collection, 
in order to serve new purposes that do not replace the original use of 
the published books, constitutes fair use of the copyrighted works.78 
Fair use will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in 
encouraging the development of new and innovative uses. Fair use 
matters, however, only when users are subject to copyright suit. 
What is the role of fair use in the current copyright ecosystem? Does 
fair use still matter for copyright enforcement? Does the shift in 
copyright enforcement from courts to online intermediaries alter the 
role of copyright? Does it marginalize the practical importance of 
fair use for day-to-day copyright disputes? 
This Part discusses empirical evidence derived from a study of 
court cases in Israel, where defendant invoked the recently 
introduced fair use claim. I begin by briefly introducing Israeli 
copyright law and the legal reform that replaced the British fair-
dealing doctrine with the American model of fair use. Next, I present 
 
 75.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Justifications for Copyright Limitations and 
Exceptions, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 1, 33 
(Ruth Okediji ed., 2016). 
 76.  See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 75, at 33; Ben Depoorter, Technology and 
Uncertainty: The Shaping Effect on Copyright Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1831, 1834 
(2009); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of 
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 404-
05 (2005) (“In addition, a structural analysis of fair use indicates that the doctrine 
is meant to be used as a flexible standard through which the judiciary can 
determine the application of copyright in response to social and technological 
changes - fair use was never intended to preserve the status quo in the face of 
change.”); Gwen Hinze et al., The Fair Use Doctrine in the United States – A 
Response to the Kernochan Report (July 26, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2298833. 
 77.  See HathiTrust, supra note 8 (enabling this authorization “adds to the 
original something new with a different purpose and a different character”).  
 78.  See id.; see also Google, supra note 8, at 215.  
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the findings of several studies that offer some empirical evidence on 
the role of fair use in copyright enforcement. I compare reliance on 
fair use in court disputes with its use in the context of enforcement 
by online intermediaries. Part IV will discuss several policy 
implications of these observations. 
A. LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS UNDER ISRAELI LAW 
1. From Fair Dealing to Fair Use 
Israel introduced fair use in 2007 as part of a major copyright 
reform, enacting the new 2007 Copyright Act).79 The 2007 Copyright 
Act replaced the old British Copyright Act of 1911, which was in 
force ever since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.80 The 
statutory fair use provision replaced the much more limited British 
fair dealing doctrine, which permits use only for purposes explicitly 
listed by the law.81 Fair use, in contrast, defines an open-ended 
standard that gives the courts broad discretion to decide which 
unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work, might nevertheless be 
considered permissible. 
The process of incorporating the fair use doctrine into Israeli 
 
 79.  See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10. The Act was passed by the 
Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) on November 19, 2007, and came into force on 
May 25, 2008. See also id. § 77. Pursuant to the transitional provisions of the 2007 
Law, the new copyright legislation shall apply to works made prior to the 
commencement of the law, subject to certain exceptions. Acts which were 
performed in relation to a work before the commencement of the 2007 Copyright 
Law, are governed by the former law. Yet, an act which is not an infringement of 
copyright or of moral rights under the 2007 Law, shall not be actionable according 
to the provisions of the former copyright law. This means that the exemptions 
listed by the new 2007 Copyright Law, including fair use, apply to acts which were 
done in relation to a work before the commencement of the new law. See id. § 
78(c). In other words, an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work prior to the new 
law, which qualifies as fair use, will not be deemed infringing. See also TAMIR 
AFORI, COPYRIGHT ACT 540 (2012) (Hebrew).  
 80.  See Copyright Act 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46, § 37(2)(a) (Eng.); see also 
Copyright Ordinance, CURRENT LAW 389. The Copyright Ordinance was amended 
several times by the Israeli Parliament. See id. The transitional provisions of the 
2007 Law provide that the Copyright Act of 1911, 3 Annotated Laws of Palestine 
2475, and the Copyright Ordinance of 1924 continue to apply to certain matters. 
See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 78. 
 81.  Fair dealing under the 1911 Copyright Act, permitted the use of a 
copyrighted work for a purpose strictly defined by law, as long as the scope of use 
was fair 
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copyright law began, however, years earlier in 1993 with the seminal 
ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court in Geva v. Walt Disney Co. 82 In 
Geva the Court addressed the use of the cartoon character Donald 
Duck in a satirical work.83 To qualify as fair dealing under the 
British clause, the permitted use must be classified under one of the 
purposes enumerated by the law, e.g. criticism, research or self-
learning.84 The Court has given a broad interpretation to the notion of 
“criticism,” concluding that satire might also qualify as criticism, as 
well as any act “placing a work in a new context that sheds 
unexpected light upon it and reveals hidden layers.”85 However, not 
every use for purposes of criticism would constitute fair dealing. A 
second condition that must be satisfied in order to qualify as fair 
dealing is fairness of use. As it lacked the criteria to evaluate fairness 
in this case, the Court applied the four-factor analysis per section 107 
of the US 1976 Copyright Act.86 Thus, the American fair use 
doctrine was applied within the framework of the British fair dealing 
provisions.87 Following Geva, this hybrid doctrine of fair dealing/fair 
use evolved in the lower courts as judge-made laws, and was 
eventually codified as fair use in the 2007 Copyright Act.88 
2. Permitted Uses 
Under the 2007 Copyright Act, any unauthorized use of a 
copyrighted work that has been granted exclusive rights may 
constitute an infringement,89 provided that the use is not permitted by 
any of the exceptions and limitations listed in Chapter Four.90 The 
 
 82.  See CA 2687/92 Geva v. Walt Disney Inc. 48(1) PD 251 (1993) (Isr.). 
 83.  See id.  
 84.  Copyright Act (1911), supra note 80, §2(1)(i).  
 85.  See Geva, supra note 82. 
 86.  General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 107, 90 Stat. 
2541, 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
 87.  Eventually, the Court denied fair dealing in that case, holding that it was a 
commercial use that may cause economic harm to the plaintiff. See Geva, supra 
note 82. 
 88.  See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 19.  
 89.  Id. § 47 (stating that the exclusive rights include reproduction, publication 
of a work which was not yet published, public performance, broadcasting, making 
the work available to the public, making a derivative work, and the rental of 
physical copies to the public for a commercial purpose (if it is a computer 
program, provided the program is not only ancillary to the primary rental object)). 
 90.  Id. § 47. (“A person who does in relation to a work, any of the acts 
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Israeli law further extends moral rights for authors to include the 
right of attribution and the right of integrity.91 These rights are not 
subject to the exception and limitations, including fair use.92 
Chapter Four of the Copyright Act, entitled Permitted Uses,93 
defines the circumstances under which exploitation or use of a 
copyrighted work would be permissible by law even in the absence 
of a license from the copyright owner.94 In addition to fair use, the 
law lists multiple uses that are permitted without authorization of the 
copyright owner, such as preparation of certain copies by public 
libraries and archives;95 public performances in educational 
institutions;96 transient and incidental copying of a work, provided 
that this is an integral part of communication conducted by an 
intermediary network;97 or making transient copies when necessary 
 
specified in section 11, or who authorizes another person to perform any such act, 
without the consent of the copyright owner, infringes the copyright, unless such act 
is permitted pursuant to the provisions of Chapter IV.”).  
 91.  See id. § 45(a) (highlighting that this moral right of attribution and 
integrity applies to authors of artistic works, dramatic works, musical or literary 
works, but not computer programs).  
 92.  The right of integrity is subject, however, to a reasonableness test. § 50(b) 
provides that any derogatory acts in relation to the work, that would otherwise may 
violate the author’s moral right, “shall not constitute an infringement of the said 
moral right where the act was reasonable in the circumstances of the case.” See id. 
§ 47(b). 
 93.  See Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 18-32.  
 94.  Id. § 18 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 11, the doing of the 
actions specified in sections 19 to 30 is permitted subject to the conditions 
specified respectively in the aforesaid sections and for the purpose of carrying out 
the objectives specified therein, without the consent of the right holder or payment, 
however with respect to the activities specified in section 32 – upon payment and 
in accordance with the provisions of that section.”). 
 95.  Id. § 30-31. These sections exempt certain uses in libraries and archives of 
the type prescribed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Education, for the 
purpose of preservation. 
 96.  Id. § 29 (explaining that the law permits public performance in an 
educational institution, provided that it is made to an audience composed strictly of 
students and employees of the educational institution, the students’ relatives or 
others directly connected to the educational activity of the institution. A more 
limited exemption applies to the public performance of films where performance is 
permitted for teaching or examination purposes only); see also id. § 67(a)-(b)(2) 
(stating that the minister responsible for prescribing such regulations for the 
implementation of the law is the Minister of Justice subject to approval by the 
Minister of Education).  
 97.  Id. § 26. 
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to enable lawful use of the work, provided that the said copy does not 
have significant economic value in itself.98 
Fair use was modeled after the U.S copyright law, with the explicit 
intention of the legislator to allow Israeli courts to rely on US case 
law for its interpretation. The fair use provision under the Israeli 
Copyright Act is similar, but not identical, to the U.S. provision. 
Section 19 provides that: 
Fair use of a work is permitted for purposes such as: private study, 
research, criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction 
and examination by an educational institution. 
In determining whether a use made of a work is fair within the meaning of 
this section, the factors to be considered shall include, inter alia, all of the 
following: 
The purpose and character of the use; 
The character of the work used; 
The scope of the use, quantitatively and qualitatively, in relation to the 
work as a whole; 
The impact of the use on the value of the work and its potential market. 99 
 
Section 19(c) authorizes the Minister of Justice to “make 
regulations prescribing conditions under which a use shall be deemed 
a fair use.”100 The purpose of establishing this authority was to 
reduce the uncertainty resulting from the open ended nature of the 
 
 98.  Id.  
The transient copying, including incidental copying, of a work, is permitted if such 
is an integral part of a technological process whose only purpose is to enable 
transmission of a work as between two parties, through a communications 
network, by an intermediary entity, or to enable any other lawful use of the work, 
provided the said copy does not have significant economic value in itself.  
This exemption should be understood in the light of the broad definition of the 
exclusive right to reproduce works in § 12. The statutory definition covers, among 
other things, the storage of a copyrighted work by any technological means, and 
the making of a temporary copy of a work.  
 99.  Copyright Law (2007), supra note 10, § 19. 
 100.  Id. § 19(c). 
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fair use doctrine.101 So far, however, no regulation under this 
provision has been issued. 
Since the effective date of the law, Israeli courts developed the fair 
use doctrine through adjudication. As is often the case with legal 
transplants, fair use doctrine in Israeli law has developed a unique 
meaning that may depart from its origin.102 For instance, courts 
generally apply the four factors analysis when determining fairness 
of use, yet some courts have also added an original requirement by 
which appropriate credit (attribution) must be accorded to the 
original author in order for the use to be considered fair.103 
Israeli courts acknowledged the importance of access to 
knowledge, by holding that maximizing access to copyrighted 
materials by the general public serves the ultimate goal of copyright 
law.104 Courts have also recognized the significance of 
transformative use for fostering the goals of copyright law,105 
although noting that this interest must be balanced against the 
proprietary interests of the copyright owner.106 
 
 101.  See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
395, 395-96, 434, 437 (2009) (proposing an administrative tribunal that would 
offer declarative judgment on fair use); see generally Michael W. Carroll, Fixing 
Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007); see also Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory 
Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 122, 151-52 (2004); Gideon Parchomovsky & 
Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2007) 
(proposing “safe harbors”).  
 102.  See generally Michael Birnhack, Judicial Snapshots and Fair Use Theory, 
5 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 264 (2015) (warning against under theorized legal 
transplants).  
 103.  See CA 2790/93 Eisenman v. Qimron 54(3) PD 817 ¶ 20 (2000) (Isr.) 
(holding that a use could not considered fair when the user did not give appropriate 
credit to the original author); see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Users’ Rights, in 
READINGS IN THE NEW COPYRIGHT ACT 327 (Michael Birnhack & Guy Pessach 
eds., 2009) (Hebrew). For further discussion of the cases following the enactment 
of the new law, where the court held that fair use is not available when the 
defendant fails to provide credit to the copyright owner, see AFORI, supra note 79, 
at 213. 
 104.  CA 326/00 City of Holon v. N.M.C. Music Ltd., 57(3) PD 658 (2003) 
(Isr); CA 9183/09 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd v. Anonymous (2012) (Isr.) 
(describing fair use as reflecting an internal balance within copyright law, between 
various goals of the law: incentivizing authors to create new works, and enriching 
the public domain).  
 105.  See Geva, supra note 82; CA 513/89 Interlego A/S v. Exin-Line Bros. S.A, 
48(4) PD 133, 163 (1994) (Isr.).  
 106.  CA 5977/07 Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Schocken Publ’g Ltd. 64(3) PD 
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B. FAIR USE ON THE GROUND 
The introduction of the fair use doctrine into Israeli copyright law 
created high hopes for promoting access to knowledge. Did the 
introduction of fair use reinforce user rights and secure more access? 
Law on the books tells only a partial story. In order to assess the 
significance of fair use, it is also necessary to explore how law is put 
into practice. It is difficult to measure the impact of fair use on 
Access to Knowledge for several reasons, including the difficulty to 
define the group of potential fair users of copyrighted materials and 
to identify potential uses that would not have taken place in the 
absence of fair use.107 Yet, studying the impact of fair use on 
copyright enforcement may offer some insights on the significance 
of this doctrine. 
Does fair use matter in copyright enforcement? An extensive study 
of enforcement practices pertaining to online copyright 
infringements in Israel offers empirical evidence on the impact of 
fair use.108 The study compared two major enforcement strategies 
following the enactment of the law: traditional court proceedings and 
the Notice and Take Down (“N&TD”) procedure implemented by 
online intermediaries.109 The study analyzed copyright lawsuits 
pertaining to online infringements filed in Israeli courts during 2010-
2013. These findings were compared to an extensive analysis of data 
on notices filed under the N&TD procedure, as reported in the 
Google Transparency Report, and a study of actual N&TD practices 
of local intermediaries. The findings are discussed in detail below. 
1. Fair Use in Courts 
It might be too soon to fully assess the significance of introducing 
fair use in Israeli law, as the law came into force less than a decade 
ago. Some trends in litigation, however, can already be identified. 
During the seven-year period that commenced on the date that the 
 
740 (2011) (Isr.).  
 107.  See generally R. van der Noll et al., Flexible Copyright The Law and 
Economics of Introducing an Open Norm in the Netherlands 37-46 (2012), 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/760 [hereinafter Flexible Copyright]; 
JEREMY MALCOLM, supra note 17, at 141-206.  
 108.  See Niva Elkin-Koren & Sharon Bar Ziv, Online Copyright Enforcement: 
The Israeli Arena (University of Haifa, July 2015) (Hebrew).  
 109.  See Id.  
ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/16  3:45 PM 
24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:1 
Copyright Act came into force, there was a sharp increase in the 
number of rulings by Israeli courts that addressed fair use.110 In only 
seven years, between 2008-2015, Israeli courts issued approximately 
48 rulings that address fair use.111 In comparison, during the period 
of sixty years between 1948 and 2008, commencing on the date of 
the establishment of the State of Israel and ending on the date that 
the Copyright Act came into force, fair dealing was addressed by 
roughly 30 rulings.112 
Published rulings only partially present the role of fair use in 
copyright litigation. The reason is that many lawsuits do not end in a 
ruling. An empirical analysis of lawsuits and briefs may offer a 
broader view of the legal proceedings, interim decisions, and 
lawsuits that were concluded by Alternative Dispute Resolutions.113 
The current study therefore analyzed all of the lawsuits filed in Israel 
for online copyright in the years 2010- 2013.114 The findings show 
that fair use was claimed by defendants in only 11% of the cases.115 
In the vast majority of cases, the claim of fair use was not even 
raised. 
This small number of fair use claims is somewhat surprising. 
Indeed, lawsuits are self-selected by plaintiffs; therefore, it could be 
reasonably assumed that plaintiffs would avoid filing a lawsuit that 
explicitly raises fair use. Yet, defendants who do not believe that 
their claims are set in stable ground may avoid litigation altogether 
 
 110.  Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.  
 111.  Id.  
 112.  A caveat: this data should be understood in light of the general increase in 
litigation and the increase in copyright litigation in particular.  
 113.  See generally Matthew Sag, Empirical Studies of Copyright Litigation: 
Nature of Suit Coding 1-7 (Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Research Paper No. 2013-017, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330256; see also id. at 2 (citing George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 
(1984)); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for 
Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 
75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 168 (2006).  
 114.  The relevant cases were identified using the electronic case management 
system of the Israeli Courts System (“NetLaw”) and appropriate legal databases. 
The analysis included the identity of the litigants (distinguishing between 
individuals, corporate and public players), the types of works which were the 
subject of the lawsuit, the types of remedies sought by litigants and granted in 
practice, and the different types of rulings that were handed by the court.  
 115.  See generally Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108. 
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and opt for a settlement. Choosing to face litigation may therefore 
signal a certain basis for denying the suit. Consequently, the finding 
that defendants who chose to litigate rather than settle will refrain 
from raising fair use claims is surprising. Indeed, defendants’ claims 
are not limited to fair use. The defendant could raise an entire range 
of issues, including denying the plaintiff’s copyright or refuting the 
claim that their action constitutes an infringement under the law. Yet, 
in view of the broad discretion afforded to the court in fair use cases, 
it was predicted that more defendants would raise this legal claim.116 
These findings suggest that fair use had a relatively small impact 
on copyright enforcement. There is one important caveat to these 
findings. One should keep in mind that the study analyzed lawsuits 
that were filed in court. Legal actions, however, also take place 
outside of court via negotiations, settlements, and cease-and-desist 
letters sent by potential claimants who believe that their copyright 
has been infringed. At times, this activity is more extensive than 
litigation in the courtroom. Legal actions outside of the court may 
also influence litigation and the outcome of the legal proceedings. 
Settlements are reached in the shadow of the law and are shaped, 
among other factors, by the prospects of winning in court.117 
Consequently, the importance of fair use should be measured outside 
of the courtroom as well. One example that demonstrates the 
mobilizing significance of fair use is the struggle to secure access to 
educational materials in Israel. The introduction of fair use inspired 
the establishment of a coalition of Israeli academic institutions that 
proactively developed a Code of Fair Use Best Practices, which 
governs fair use for educational purposes.118 These principles were 
eventually adopted in a settlement agreement between Hebrew 
 
 116.  Id.  
 117.  See Leah Chan Grinvald, Policing the Cease-and-Desist Letter, 49 U.S.F. 
L. REV. 411, 411 (2015) (arguing that in the US only a small proportion of legal 
disputes ends up in court). One reason for the large discrepancy between the 
number of legal disputes and the extent of court litigation in the field of copyright 
is the widespread use of legal threat and of removal requests. There are several 
reasons why potential claimants prefer to use threatening letters requesting 
removal rather than going to court: the cost of litigation, uncertainty regarding the 
results of litigation, and success in previous cases using removal request letters. 
 118.  See generally Amira Dotan et al., Fair Use Best Practices for Higher 
Education Institutions: The Israeli Experience, J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
(forthcoming). 
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University and two major academic publishers, which was approved 
by the court.119 
Israeli adjudication on user rights suggests that simply introducing 
fair use into the statute is not the culmination of copyright reform. 
Instead, it is only the beginning of an ongoing struggle to safeguard 
unlicensed use that is deemed necessary to the very creativity which 
copyright law is designed to foster. 
2. Fair use in copyright enforcement by online intermediaries 
As discussed above, a large portion of online copyright 
enforcement nowadays is performed via online intermediaries. 
Online intermediaries are generally not held liable for infringing 
materials posted by their subscribers unless they knowingly 
contributed to the copyright infringement.120 Moreover, the safe 
harbor regime established by the US DMCA grants immunity to 
online intermediaries from monetary liability, provided that they 
comply with the DMCA safe harbor provisions.121 To qualify for safe 
harbor, a hosting facility must meet several requirements, including 
applying the Notice and Take Down (N&TD) procedures.122 The 
 
 119.  For an English translation of the settlement, see 
http://weblaw.haifa.ac.il/en/AcademyInCommunity/ClinicList/tech/Documents/Co
de%20of%20Best%20Practices%20[English%20Translation].pdf  
see also Ariel Katz, Israeli Publishers and Hebrew University Reach Historic 
Agreement on Fair Use, ARIEL KATZ ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, COMPETITION, 
INNOVATION, & OTHER ISSUES (Nov. 28, 2013), http://arielkatz.org/archives/3042; 
Kevin Smith, Fair Use, Georgia State, and the Rest of the World, DUKE UNIV. 
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://blogs.library.duke.edu/scholcomm/2013/12/02/fair-use-
georgia-state-and-the-rest-of-the-world; CrivBlog, GSU Updates and a Way 
Forward, CRIVBLOG (Dec. 3, 2013), https://crivblog.com/2013/12/03/gsu-updates-
and-a-way-forward-from-israel.  
 120.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2016); 
Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright 
Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 
375, 376 (2009).  
 121.  See id. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that to qualify for immunity under the 
N&TD regime, an OSP cannot have actual knowledge that infringing content is on 
its system or be “aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent”); see also id. § 512(c)(1)(B) (providing that if OSPs later become aware 
of such content, they must expeditiously remove it from their system; moreover, it 
should not receive a direct financial benefit from any infringing activity, which it 
has the right and ability to control).  
 122.  See id. § 512(a)-(d), (i) (immunity from monetary liability for materials 
that are transmitted over networks, cached on a server, linked to, or stored at the 
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N&TD procedure established by the DMCA requires online 
intermediaries to respond “expeditiously” to notices of infringement 
by removing or disabling access to allegedly infringing material 
when certain conditions are met.123 The DMCA further encourages 
compliance with N&TD by exempting OSPs from liability for 
mistaken, yet good faith removal of material.124 
It is important to note that currently, online intermediaries are 
encouraged to remove materials expeditiously upon receiving a 
notice, without exercising any discretion regarding the substantive 
claims.125 As further explained below, until recently right-holders 
were also exempted from considering fair use prior to issuing a 
removal request. 
Israeli law, like many jurisdictions outside the United States, has 
no clear statutory framework that governs the N&TD procedure. 
Israeli courts have applied the doctrine of contributory infringement 
in the case of online intermediaries, holding that intermediaries will 
be held liable for infringing materials posted by their users if they 
knowingly contributed to the infringement.126 Therefore, similar to 
U.S. law, online intermediaries might be subject to contributory 
liability for copyright infringing materials posted by their 
subscribers, if they fail to remove the materials upon receiving a 
notice. 
 
 
direction of a user, OSPs are required to adopt and implement certain policies. In 
particular, OSPs must comply with two preliminary policies. First, they must adopt 
and reasonably implement a policy to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers 
and must notify users of this plan. Second, they must also accommodate “standard 
technical measures” used by copyright owners to identify infringing material).  
 123.  See id. §§ 512(b)(2)(E)(i)-(ii), 512(c)(1)(C).  
 124.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120 § 512(g)(1) (stating that 
intermediaries that fail to act in good faith may lose safe harbor and may be 
required to pay damages to content providers whose material was unlawfully 
removed under the intermediaries’ stated terms of use).  
 125.  See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling 
Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 626 (2006). 
 126.  See, e.g., Schocken, supra note 106; CC (CT) 567-08-09 ALIS, Ass’n for 
the Protection of Cinematic Works v. Rotter.net Ltd. (Aug. 8, 2011). Note that 
liability for contributory copyright infringement under Israeli case law requires 
actual knowledge of the infringing acts. Constructive knowledge would be 
insufficient for establishing liability.  
ELKINREVISED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/24/16  3:45 PM 
28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [32:1 
The Google search engine has become a focal point for enforcing 
copyright. Google is the main platform for locating sites and gaining 
access to materials posted on the internet. Content that is inaccessible 
via Google is difficult to find. Consequently, when Google removes 
links to allegedly infringing materials or even simply relegate links 
to the bottom of the search results, 127 the allegedly infringing content 
might still be available online on the original website, but this may 
significantly reduce traffic to the site. 
The study reported above, further sought to record the scope of 
online copyright enforcement targeting Israeli websites, by analyzing 
data released by Google. Google, which is a U.S.-based OSP, is 
following the DMCA, and applying the N&TD to notices targeting 
Israeli websites. Google regularly receives requests (notices) from 
apparent copyright owners to remove links to allegedly infringing 
materials from the search results returned by the engine. Notices are 
conveyed to Google through an online form.128 Each request lists the 
name of the sender, the name of the copyright owner, and one or 
more webpages (URLs) that Google is asked to remove from the 
search results. After receiving the removal request, Google often 
removes the link, to comply with the DMCA.129 To increase 
transparency with regard to this activity, Google publishes periodic 
transparency reports (Google Transparency Report, GTR).130 
The analysis of Google GTR yielded a high volume of notices that 
is consistently increasing. Based on the analysis of data reported by 
 
 127.  Google’s Pirate algorithm, revised in 2014, changes its search algorithm in 
such a way that sites for which a large number of removal requests have been 
received are assigned a low ranking in search results, relegating them to the bottom 
of the search results, where it is difficult to locate them. See Continued Progress 
on Fighting Piracy, GOOGLE PUB. POLICY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2014), 
https://publicpolicy.googleblog.com/2014/10/continued-progress-on-fighting-
piracy.html. 
 128.  Removing Content from Google, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/ 
legal/troubleshooter/1114905?rd=1#ts=1115655 (last visited Jul. 22, 2016). 
 129.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(d).  
 130.  The GTR contains data related to the removal requests it received, 
including information on the entities that sent the requests, the allegedly infringing 
content, and the manner in which the requests were addressed and the materials in 
question handled. https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/. The data published 
by Google relate both to the handling of the specific removal requests and to the 
“suspected domain names.” See Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www. 
google.com/transparencyreport/ (last visited Jul. 22, 2016). 
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the GTR, the study found that during the period between July 2011 
and December 2013,131 a total of 7091 removal requests concerning 
Israeli URLs (i.e. with an “.il” extension) were submitted to 
Google.132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of requests filed with Google for removal of Israeli 
webpages from search results, July 2011-December 2013 
By comparison, during the years 2010-2013 a total number of 687 
copyright infringement lawsuits were filed.133 The majority of 
lawsuits involving copyright infringement during that time 
concerned infringements outside the internet (60%), while only 40% 
of the lawsuits addressed online infringements.134 
 
 
 
 
 131.  See infra Figure 1: Distribution of Requests Filed with Google for 
Removal of Israeli Webpages from Search Results, July 2011-December 2013 
(showing the distribution of requests submitted between July 2011 and December 
2013. To avoid an edge effect, we do not present data before July 2011 and after 
December 2013, which is the reason for the gap between the 6926 requests shown 
in the graph and the 7091 requests submitted according to the Google reports). 
 132.  Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Only 32% of the lawsuits (216 cases) exclusively addressed online 
infringements, and the remaining 8% involved both online and offline 
infringements. 
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Figure 2: The Number of Internet Copyright Cases per Year, 2010-2013 
These findings demonstrate the prevalence of copyright 
enforcement by online intermediaries. Its scale is unparalleled to 
copyright enforcement in court. In other words, the vast majority of 
disputes related to allegedly copyright infringing materials rely on 
N&TD procedures, and, currently, these procedures do not involve 
any fair use claims.135 
As explained, fair use plays a relatively minor role in the 
enforcement procedures of online intermediaries. An experiment, 
which was part of the same study, took a closer look at the actual 
practices of local online intermediaries and confirmed this 
conclusion.136 The study sought to systematically test how hosting 
websites implement the N&TD policy.137 In order to do so, different 
types of infringing and non-infringing materials, including content 
that clearly qualifies as fair use, were uploaded to designated hosting 
facilities.138 After uploading the content, a takedown notice was sent 
 
 135.  Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108. 
 136.  Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66. 
 137.  These platforms were designated by various Israeli forums as being the 
most popular file sharing platforms in Israel, a designation that was also confirmed 
by the second biggest advertising company in Israel. Id. 
 138.  The researchers have attempted to upload three types of images to the 
image-sharing platforms: (1) an infringing image of a known work with a 
copyright notice ©; (2) a non-infringing image; (3) a non-infringing image with a 
copyright notice ©. The researchers have also attempted to uploaded different 
types of videos snippets to the video-sharing platforms: (a) a 2:42 minutes 
infringing video with Content ID (a snippet of an original, copyright-protected 
video, can trigger an automatic content filtering technology, such as YouTube’s 
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to the platform claiming that the content infringes copyrights and 
requesting its removal.139 During all stages, the response time and 
follow-up actions of the various platforms were systematically 
recorded. 140 
The findings show that local hosting facilities in Israel behaved 
inconsistently and thus were unpredictable in how they detected 
online infringements and enforced copyrights. Specifically, 25% of 
video-sharing platforms and approximately 10% of image-sharing 
platforms seemed to employ a system of ex ante filtering of 
presumed infringing online content, indicating that online 
intermediaries occasionally go beyond N&TD and remove content 
automatically before receiving complaints of copyright 
infringement.141 Furthermore, 50% of video-sharing platforms and 
12.5% of image-sharing platforms removed infringing content after 
 
Content ID); (b) a similar snippet of the same video, but without Content ID (a 
snippet of an already-copied video may not be identified by an automatic content 
filtering technology such as YouTube’s Content ID; (c) a non-infringing short 
video; (d) a Fair Use homemade video clip; (e) a 19 seconds non-infringing video 
with a copyright notice ©, and (f) a 3:22 minutes video of non-infringing photos 
with a copyright notice © and with an infringing music. Id.  
 139.  The study proceeded in several steps, each of which was systematically 
recorded by the researchers: First, different types of content were submitted to the 
examined platforms. When upload was unsuccessful, the researchers assumed that 
an ex ante mechanism of filtering was used. Second, when upload was successful, 
the researchers checked periodically whether the content remained online or was 
otherwise blocked/removed. Third, if the content remained online after 72 hours, 
the researchers sent a notice to the platform complaining it was probably hosting 
copyright infringing content. Fourth, if the content was removed by the platform 
after receiving the notice, the researchers reported whether they received a notice 
of removal. In the case that they were notified about the removal, the researchers 
reported whether that notification contained information about the removal reason; 
whether it contained information about the complainant and whether it provided 
any dispute opportunities. Fifth, the researchers examined periodically whether the 
removed content remained offline. Sixth, after two weeks, the researchers 
attempted to reload the removed content and reported whether reload was 
successful, partly successful or unsuccessful. Id. 
 140.  The study sought to determine whether they filter infringing content ex 
ante by automatically blocking presumably infringing uploads, or whether they 
only remove such posts ex post, upon notice of copyright infringement; whether 
they verify the rights claimed by the complainants; whether they notify alleged 
infringers and complainants about content removals; whether the content becomes 
accessible following the removal and whether they learn from past incidents and 
automatically block second time attempts to reload infringing content. Id. 
 141.  Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66. 
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receiving a complaint notice, while one-third of the image-sharing 
platforms also removed non-infringing content after receiving a 
complaint notice.142 In other words, some platforms allow content 
that is filtered by others; some platforms rigidly respond to any 
notice requesting removal of content despite it being clearly non-
infringing; while other platforms fail to remove content upon 
receiving notification of alleged infringement. 
Overall, the study revealed that copyright enforcement by online 
intermediaries in Israel is robust in terms of scale and volume. These 
findings are consistent with global trends. Copyright owners prefer to 
vindicate their rights by resorting to online resolution systems, 
instead of going through the hustle of filing an expensive and time-
consuming suit for copyright infringement. Copyright enforcement 
thus becomes algorithmic: right holders are using robots to search the 
web for infringing activity, and submit voluminous amounts of 
automatic removal requests simultaneously to all platforms identified 
as containing allegedly infringing material.143 
These findings also raise concerns regarding Access to 
Knowledge. The first concern is that while fair use can be invoked in 
a copyright infringement lawsuit, there is little room for fair use 
under the current enforcement procedures implemented by online 
intermediaries. Second, the findings show that online intermediaries 
remove non-infringing materials, including materials that clearly 
qualify as fair use.144 These findings are consistent with anecdotes 
reported elsewhere on the removal of fair use materials.145 
Third, it is apparent that fair use is not incorporated into the 
current Israeli N&TD practices in any way. On the contrary, in the 
absence of any procedure similar to the DMCA, Israeli 
 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  See Jennifer M. Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna L. Schofield, Notice and 
Takedown in Everyday Practice (UC Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 
2755628, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628 
 144.  A fair use home-made video, in which a toddler is singing 48 seconds of a 
copyrighted song, was removed upon a notice in 1/4 of hosting sites to which it 
was uploaded. Id. 
 145.  See Dineen Wasylik, Take Down Abuse: From Harry Potter to Legos, 
DPW LEGAL (Feb. 7, 2014), http://ip-appeals.com/take-down-abuse-from-harry-
potter-to-legos (recounting how a ten-year-old boy’s self-authored original video 
starring his LEGO mini-figures and garbage truck was blocked despite the fact that 
he used royalty-free music). 
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intermediaries have a strong incentive to remove any material 
expeditiously upon receiving a notice. Otherwise, they might be 
exposed to contributory liability for hosting infringing materials. 
Also, under the DMCA online intermediaries have strong 
incentives to take down or block access to allegedly infringing 
content to avoid the risk of facing liability for their users’ 
infringements.146 Indeed, the N&TD procedure established by the 
DMCA requires OSPs to take “reasonable steps promptly to notify 
the subscriber that it has removed or disabled access to the 
material”147 and promptly forward any counter notices from alleged 
infringers back to the original complainant.148 If after ten to fourteen 
days following receipt of a counter notice, the complainant does not 
notify the OSP that she had filed a lawsuit, the OSP must reinstate 
the contested material.149 Yet the DMCA’s counter notice procedure 
places the burden of responding to notices on alleged infringers. 
Recipients of removal notices may often lack important information 
about the allegations and the legal expertise necessary to address 
them. Given the volume of notices in the robust sphere of online 
copyright enforcement, a counter notice is often impractical. The 
handful of cases addressing the counter notice procedure suggest that 
this procedure is long, the burden of proof is high, and it does not 
effectively deter right-holders from issuing mass notifications.150 
All in all, the findings of the study suggest that the presence of fair 
 
 146.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) 
(2016); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment, 
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 
11, 23 (2006) (discussing the dangers of using proxy censors on free speech); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints on Copyright after Golan v. 
Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1120-27 (2013).  
 147.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(g)(2)(A) 
(2016). 
 148.  See id. § 512(g)(2)(B) (2016). A counter-notification must include the 
following: (A) a physical or electronic signature; (B) identification of the material 
removed and its former location; (C) statement under penalty of perjury that the 
user has a good faith belief the material was mistakenly removed; (D) the user’s 
name, address, and phone number; and (E) consent to the jurisdiction of Federal 
District Court. See also 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3) (2016). 
 149.  Search engines, on the other hand, are not required to notify the alleged 
infringer of removal because they are not expected to have any service relationship 
with the alleged infringer. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, 
§ 512(d) (2016); Urban, supra note 143. 
 150.  Urban, supra note 143. 
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use in the actual practice of copyright enforcement is minimal. For 
fair use to remain significant in the new digital frontiers, it must be 
incorporated into the N&TD procedures. This will be further 
discussed in part IV below. 
IV. FAIR USE - NEW FRONTIERS 
Does fair use matter for access to knowledge? Fair use leaves the 
courts broad discretion, allowing them to develop a space for 
unlicensed use and adjust the law to new needs and circumstances. 
Therefore, fair use will undoubtedly continue to play an important 
role in encouraging the development of new and innovative uses. 
Fair use matters, however, only when copyright claims are invoked. 
Where barriers to access are not tied to copyright, fair use may 
become secondary. The shift in copyright enforcement from courts to 
online intermediaries alter the role of copyright, and may marginalize 
the practical importance of fair use for day-to-day copyright disputes. 
Can fair use secure some space for non-infringing use of copyrighted 
materials in this environment? 
The Israeli case study demonstrates that online intermediaries have 
become the primary enforcers of copyright law.151 This enforcement 
arena differs from copyright enforcement in court in many 
respects,152 two of which might be particularly relevant to fair use. 
The first is that enforcement takes place in private facilities, and the 
second is its algorithmic implementation. The fact that online 
intermediaries are private facilities raises a whole new set of issues 
related to the increasingly obscured boundaries between the public 
and private domains. For instance, when intermediaries choose to 
filter allegedly infringing materials or to remove some materials 
upon notice, they may simply be making private choices regarding 
content that is made available on their platforms.153 At the same time 
however, when online intermediaries monitor, filter, block and 
remove allegedly infringing materials they engage, de facto, in 
copyright enforcement.154 Are online intermediaries free to decide 
 
 151.  See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text. 
 152.  Elkin-Koren & Bar Ziv, supra note 108. 
 153.  James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 870-71 
(2014). 
 154.  Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66.  
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which content to carry? Are they subject to any duties in exercising 
discretion on which content to remove? Another set of issues relates 
to cost and the reasonable scope of law enforcement duties that 
might be imposed on private entities.155 
A second characteristic of copyright enforcement by online 
intermediaries is that it is algorithmic. Over the past two decades, the 
N&TD regime has become ubiquitous and embedded in the system 
design of all major intermediaries. Major copyright owners 
increasingly use robots to identify unauthorized use of their work 
online and send large numbers of takedown requests. In response, 
major online intermediaries use algorithms to filter, block, and 
disable access to allegedly infringing content automatically, with 
little or no human intervention.156 The N&TD procedure mandates 
immediate removal and pushes fair use aside. 
Copyright enforcement by online intermediaries introduces new 
frontiers. If fair use is narrowly interpreted as merely a legal defense 
(“the legal defense approach”), its impact on Access to Knowledge is 
likely to decline in the new copyright frontiers. Indeed, fair use may 
still offer a powerful legal doctrine – enabling the court to adjust the 
law to accommodate new technological changes. Yet, in the 
emerging environment that is regulated by online intermediaries, 
governed by licenses, terms of use and algorithms, copyright is 
neither the problem nor the solution. 
Fair use as an affirmative defense merely offers an excuse for 
circumstances in which an otherwise infringing copying will impose 
copyright liability. But fair use as a legal defense might be largely 
irrelevant to online enforcement, and consequently the legal defense 
approach to fair use might be insufficient for counterbalancing these 
developments. In a N&TD regime, online intermediaries are required 
to comply with the notice expeditiously and exercise no discretion 
regarding the allegedly infringing materials. In voluntary blocking, 
filtering and removal by online intermediaries (DMCA Plus), there 
might not be a copyright claim to confront at all, and there is often 
 
 155.  See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film 
Verleih GmbH ( March 27, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document. 
jsf?text=&docid=149924&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first
&part=1&cid=572548 (showing that cost was one of the issues addressed by a 
recent decision of the CJEU on site-blocking order).  
 156.  See infra note 157 and accompanying text.  
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no procedure for raising fair use claims. Therefore, these new 
frontiers call for a different approach to addressing the freedom of 
access that is protected under fair use. 
The following discussion proposes an approach that could help 
revive fair use in this context. First, at the conceptual level, fair use 
should be interpreted as a user’s right and not simply an affirmative 
defense. Second, fair use must be incorporated into online 
enforcement processes, either by clarifying legal procedures or by 
embedding fair use considerations in the design. The following 
discussion briefly introduces the user rights approach to fair use and 
demonstrates how it could become useful for ensuring access to 
copyright materials in an environment of robotic notices and 
algorithmic enforcement. The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in 
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp157 is discussed in order to demonstrate 
how the user rights approach could be incorporated in the N&TD 
procedure and offer fair use by design. 
A. THE USER RIGHTS APPROACH 
The user rights approach to fair use presumes that incentives to 
authors are only one means of promoting creativity, while other, 
equally important mechanisms focus on securing adequate access 
rights for users. In other words, the rights of authors (for incentives 
or just reward) and the rights of users to use creative works (e.g., 
read, learn, disseminate, re-use, and transform) are different 
mechanisms for promoting copyright goals.158 From this perspective, 
the fair use doctrine significantly limits the scope of the monopoly 
granted to authors under copyright law. It is designed to identify the 
circumstances in which unlicensed use should be permissible in 
order to promote the goals that copyright law seeks to achieve. The 
right to perform these uses without a license is derived from 
copyright intended goals, and therefore fair use is not simply a non-
infringing use, but rather it is mandated by copyright policy. 
The Supreme Court of Israel addressed the issue of user rights 
under the new copyright act, in several cases pertaining to the legal 
 
 157.  See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 158.  Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright in a Digital Ecosystem: A User-Rights 
Approach, in COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS (Ruth 
Okediji ed., 2015).  
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status of permissible uses. 159 Initially, in 2012, the Court explicitly 
rejected the position that fair use is a user right. The case Football 
Association Premier League Ltd v Anonymous (2012)160 involved a 
petition to unmask the identity of an anonymous user who streamed 
unauthorized broadcasts of football matches owned by the English 
Premier League. Although the petition was dismissed on procedural 
grounds, the Israeli Supreme Court held that streaming constituted 
copyright infringement and that fair use did not apply.161 The Court 
further clearly stated the legal defense approach to fair use. The 
Court described fair use as facilitating copyright internal balance, 
between incentivizing authors and enriching the public domain, yet, 
it explicitly rejected the position that fair use was a right. The Court 
explained that fair use, as an affirmative defence, could still serve 
that purpose. Moreover, the Court reasoned that even though the new 
law explicitly defined fair use as “permitted use,” it did not accord 
fair use the legal status of a ‘right’ which is equivalent to 
copyright.162 
Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court questioned this approach in 
Telran Ltd. v Charlton Communications (2013).163 The case involved 
the legality of marketing decoding cards that enabled Israeli 
customers to decode the encoded broadcasts of the World Cup 
games, which were transmitted from foreign channels via satellite. 
The Court held that merely distributing the decoding cards did not 
amount to a copyright infringement, nor was it a contributory 
infringement, since simply watching copyrighted materials did not 
constitute a copyright infringement.164 The Court explicitly rejected 
the defense approach to fair use held by the Premier League Court, 
noting that fair use is not merely a technical defense for copyright 
infringement but a permissible use.165 Consequently, even if users of 
 
 159.  See id., at 327 (arguing that the new Israeli copyright act offered a new 
legal framework for conceptualizing users’ rights).  
 160.  CC (TA) 1636/08 Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Anonymous 
(Sept. 2, 2009) (Isr.), http://www.nevo.co.il/psika_word/mechozi/me-08-1636-
11.doc. 
 161.  Id. at 2.  
 162.  Id. at 9-10. 
 163.  CA 5097/11 Telran Commc’n (1986) Ltd. vs. Charlton Ltd., 45 Int’l Rev. 
Intell. Prop. & Competition L. 233 (Isr. Sept. 2, 2013). 
 164.  Id. at 233. 
 165.  See Israeli Supreme Court: circumvention of copyright protection is not 
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these decoding cards were making unauthorized copies which were 
nevertheless considered fair use, there were no grounds for holding 
the defendant liable for contributory infringement. According to 
Justice Zilbertal, users who exercise user rights do not commit an 
excusable infringing act, but instead act in a manner that is explicitly 
permissible by law and therefore there is no infringement to begin 
with. Consequently, “when no infringement materializes, there is no 
infringement to “contribute” to.166 Hence, since the end-users carried 
out a permissible act, the middleman “contributed” to a permissible 
act – and in any event did not infringe any rights of the copyright 
owner, since these rights were not violated in the first place.”167 
Subsequently, in the case of Safecom v Raviv (2013),168 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed this approach. The decision addressed 
copying drawings of a functional electric device in a patent 
application submitted to the USPTO. The Court adopted and cited 
the user rights approach upheld in Telran and noted the judicial 
controversy on this issue, commenting that the time was ripe for an 
extended judicial panel to consider this matter.169 
Canada was a pioneer in promoting user rights.170 User rights were 
first explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004, 
in the landmark case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper 
Canada.171 This approach was recently reaffirmed in a series of 
copyright decisions.172 
 
prohibited, LAW.CO.IL (Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.law.co.il/en/m/#/news/7601/. 
 166.  Telran Commc’n, supra note 163, at 237. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  CA 7996/11 Safecom Ltd. v. Raviv (Isr. Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Safecom%2C%20Lt
d.%20v.%20Raviv.pdf. 
 169.  Id. at ¶ 35. 
 170.  See Teresa Scassa, Recalibrating Copyright Law?: A Comment on the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in CCH Canadian Limited et al. v. Law 
Society of Upper Canada, 3 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 89 (2004) (discussing how 
Théberge v. Galerie D’Art du Petit Champlain, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, and CCH 
Canadian, infra note 171, illustrated an area of law where Parliament has been 
strongly lobbied to restrict users’ rights). 
 171.  [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339 (Can.). See generally Abraham Drassinower, Taking 
User Rights Seriously, in IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE FUTURE OF CANADIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 462 (Michael Geist ed. 2005).  
 172.  Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada (SOCAN) v. 
Bell Canada, 2012 SCC 36, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 326; Canadian Copyright Licensing 
Agency, supra note 33.  
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These recent developments in Canada and Israel suggest that the 
legal status of fair use might have far-reaching consequences. 
Canadian copyright law includes fair dealing provisions, which are 
far more limited than fair use. Under fair dealing the use not only has 
to be proven fair, but must also fall under one of the strictly defined 
purposes enumerated by law. The Supreme Court of Canada held 
that since fair dealing was a user right “it must not be interpreted 
restrictively.”173 Accordingly, the Court broadly interpreted research, 
under fair dealing, as also including sampling conducted during 
consumer research, and private study as also including copying by 
teachers. 
The user rights approach to fair use could also help to set limits on 
the rights and duties of copyright owners who issue removal notices, 
and on copyright enforcement performed by online intermediaries. 
Following this approach, a copyright owner cannot limit fair use 
(right) by a unilateral license. A user rights approach to fair use may 
also affect the corresponding duties of online intermediaries, offering 
a legal framework for invalidating terms of use that unfairly restrict 
fair use and fundamental freedoms. For instance, as further 
demonstrated in the next section, right holders might be required to 
consider fair use before issuing a notice. Moreover, online 
intermediaries might be required to consider fair use in designing 
DMCA Plus procedures such as filtering. Overall, a user rights 
approach to fair use may offer more robust safeguarding of users’ 
liberties in the digital ecosystem. 
B. LENZ V. UNIVERSAL, AND BEYOND 
The recent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lenz v. Universal 
Studios174 demonstrates some of these issues. In this case, the court 
addressed the question of whether fair use should be considered by 
the copyright holder prior to sending a takedown notice. Stephanie 
Lenz uploaded a 29-second home video to YouTube in which her 
two toddlers are seen dancing in the family kitchen to the song “Let’s 
Go Crazy” by Prince. Universal, who represented Prince’s copyright, 
 
 173.  See CCH Canadian, supra note 171, at 364 (describing that the rights 
should be given the “fair and balanced reading that befits remedial legislation”). 
 174.  See Lenz, supra note 157, at 1133 (holding that a copyright holder “must 
consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification under 
Section 512(c)). 
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requested the removal of this video in a takedown notice sent to 
YouTube.175 After receiving the takedown request, YouTube 
removed the video and notified Lenz of its removal. After sending 
two counter-notifications, YouTube eventually reinstated the 
video.176 Lenz filed a suit claiming that Universal was liable for 
misrepresentation under § 512(f) of the DMCA.177 The question 
addressed was whether the law requires a copyright holder to 
consider whether the potentially infringing materials constitute fair 
use before issuing a notice. The DMCA requires that notifications 
include a statement that the complaining party “has a good faith 
belief” that the use of the materials “is not authorized by the 
copyright owner, its agent, or the law.”178 
Fair use, the court held, “is not just excused by law, it is wholly 
authorized by law.”179 According to the language of the statute, the 
court explained that “fair use of a copyrighted work is permissible 
because it is non-infringing use.”180 The court denied Universal’s 
argument that fair use is an affirmative dense that excuses otherwise 
infringing conduct. Fair use, the court held, should be viewed as a 
right, and therefore it is “authorized by law.”181 Consequently, 
issuing a takedown notice without forming a good faith belief that 
the allegedly infringing work was not authorized by law (i.e., did not 
constitute fair use) may amount to misrepresentation.182 
Accordingly, the ruling in the Lenz case requires right-holders to 
 
 175.  Id. at 1130. 
 176.  Id.  
 177.  See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, supra note 120, § 512(f) (2016) 
(providing “Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents under this 
section— (1) that material or activity is infringing, or (2) that material or activity 
was removed or disabled by mistake or misidentification, shall be liable for any 
damages . . . .”). 
 178.  Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) requires a takedown notification to include a 
“statement that the complaining party has a good faith belief that the use of the 
material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its 
agent, or the law.” 
 179.  See Lenz, supra note 157, at 1132.  
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. 
 182.  The court examined whether “Universal knowingly misrepresented that it 
had formed a good faith belief the video did not constitute fair use.” That is not to 
say that Universal should have known that the video was fair use. It only had to 
form a subjective good faith belief that a use is not authorized (i.e., it is not fair 
use). Id. at 1134. 
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consider fair use prior to sending takedown notification. If the right-
holders fail to consider fair use, they might face liability. If, 
however, they consider fair use but mistakenly believe in good faith 
that the allegedly infringing materials does not constitute fair use, 
they will not be held liable.183 
The court notes that “good faith belief” is subjective, yet, it offers 
several guidelines on what is required in order to comply with the 
statutory standard (i.e., forming a good faith belief that a use is not 
fair). Accordingly, the rights-holder should not overlook evidence to 
the contrary, yet the consideration of fair use need not be “searching 
or intensive.” 184 The court was well aware of the burden involved in 
exercising discretion of this sort: 
We are mindful of the pressing crush of voluminous infringing content 
that copyright holders face in a digital age. But that does not excuse a 
failure to comply with the procedures outlined by Congress.185 
Therefore, the court implied that consideration of fair use prior to 
issuing a takedown notice may not necessarily require a human 
review186 and might be implemented by an algorithm.187 Human 
review could be employed for the “minimal remaining content a 
computer program does not cull.”188 Yet, the court refrained from 
explicitly ruling on this issue. This language was eventually removed 
from the revised opinion. Algorithmic implementation of “good 
faith” considerations regarding the existence of fair use may raise a 
 
 183.  At the same time, however, the court emphasizes that, “A copyright holder 
who pays lip service to the consideration of fair use by claiming it formed a good 
faith belief when there is evidence to the contrary is still subject to § 512(f) 
liability.” Id. at 1135. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Lenz, supra note 157, at 1135. 
 186.  Id. (“We note, without passing judgment, that the implementation of 
computer algorithms appears to be a valid and good faith middle ground for 
processing a plethora of content while still meeting the DMCA’s requirements to 
somehow consider fair use.”). 
 187.  Id. (“For example, consideration of fair use may be sufficient if copyright 
holders utilize computer programs that automatically identify for takedown 
notifications content where: “(1) the video track matches the video track of a 
copyrighted work submitted by a content owner; (2) the audio track matches the 
audio track of that same copyrighted work; and (3) nearly the entirety . . . is 
comprised of a single copyrighted work.”). 
 188.  Id. at 1136. 
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whole new set of questions regarding liability for discretion 
exercised by such systems. For instance, who would be held 
accountable for errors, and what rate of false positives and false 
negatives would be acceptable?189 
V. CONCLUSION 
One of the greatest challenges to access to knowledge in the 21st 
century is private ordering. Terms of use, restrictions by design and 
robust algorithmic enforcement threaten to wipe out many of the 
safeguards of access created by fair use. 
The user rights approach to fair use could help set limits on 
private ordering. According to this approach, limits on fair use fall 
beyond the bundle of rights defined by copyright, and therefore 
cannot be unilaterally restricted by a license. A user rights approach 
to fair use may also affect the corresponding duties of content 
providers and online intermediaries, offering a legal framework for 
invalidating terms of use that unfairly restrict fair use and 
fundamental freedoms. 
At the procedural level, since the targets of the complaint do not 
have the option of defending themselves prior to removal of their 
content, fair use is not contested at the initial stages of algorithmic 
enforcement. Therefore, to revive and strengthen fair use in this 
arena, it is necessary to ensure that fair use considerations are applied 
prior to filing a notice. Fair use analysis might also be incorporated 
into the filtering, blocking and removal design, of online 
intermediaries, basically introducing “fair use by design.” 
Overall, adapting a user rights approach to fair use and 
incorporating fair use in the enforcing design of online intermarries 
may offer more robust safeguards for users’ liberties in the digital 
ecosystem. More universal adoption of fair use might be a positive 
development. Nevertheless, without strengthening the legal status of 
fair use and developing a jurisprudence of fair use rights, we may 
end up fighting the battles of the past. 
 
 
 189.  See Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 66. 
